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Introduction
 This presentation focuses on the Space Shuttle Primary Avionics 
Software System (PASS) and the people who developed and 
maintained this system.
 One theme is to provide quantitative data on software quality and 
reliability over a 30 year period
 Second theme is to focus on the people and organization of PASS
 Quality Measures
 Pre-build Detection Effectiveness (Inspection Plus Development 
Test) 
 Errors found by Inspection and Development Test Pre-Build 
(prior to being placed under project configuration control) 
divided by total errors
 Verification Effectiveness 
 Process DRs divided by (Process DRs plus Product DRs)
 Product Error Rate 
 Product DRs divided by new, changed, deleted source lines of 
code.  Includes only non-comment source lines of code.
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Introduction
 Quality Measures
 Consistent data relates to “code break” discrepancies
 Requirements were supplied from external sources
 Errors counted in three periods
 Errors found by Inspection and Development Test Pre-Build 
(prior to being placed under project configuration control)
 Process DRs found Post Build until a milestone called Software 
Readiness Review (SRR) for the first flight off that increment; 
typically occurs approximately 4 weeks prior to flight
 Product DRs found from SRR of first flight until end of program   
 Subset of Product DRs are those which occur in either 
terminal countdown or in flight, called in-flight DRs
 Additional special category of DRs are called Released Severity 
1 DRs. These may be process or product DRs. These are DRs 
that could cause loss of crew or vehicle that are released to any 
field site such as the Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS), the 
vehicle at KSC, or the Shuttle Avionics Integration Lab (SAIL).
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Introduction
 Common themes running through lifecycle periods
 Improvements through process enhancements
 Improvements through automation
 Defect removal following identification of significant process 
escapes
 Impact of workforce instability
 Early evaluator, adopter, and adapter of state-of-the-art software 
engineering innovations
 A significant contributor to the success of the PASS FSW organization 
has been the support of the NASA PASS software customers that have 
consistently valued quality and supported reasonable implementation 
schedules.  NASA has also supported maintaining critical skill staffing.
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Dedication To Safety
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 Developing complex human-rated flight software is a major technical 
challenge.
 Perfection required to achieve the desired level of safety
 Extremely difficult to accomplish, but can be aggressively 
pursued
 Keys to the pursuit of perfection
 Principles of Providing High Reliability Software
 Continuous Process Improvement
 Defect Elimination Process
Dedication To Safety
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Principles of Providing High Reliability Software
 Safety certification is currently based on process adherence rather than 
product.
 Assumption is that a known, controlled, repeatable process will result in a 
product of known quality.
 Process executed by personnel that are committed to safety and skilled 
relative to processes, system architecture, and specialized software 
requirements.
 Team skills and workload closely monitored by management to prevent 
over commitment that could result in quality breakdowns.
 Use “trusted” tools to develop, build, release and maintain the software.
 Use measurements to continuously assess the health of both the process 
and the product.
 Relationship between quality and reliability must be established for each 
software version and statistically demonstrated for the required 
operational profiles.
 Quality must be built into the software, at a known level, rather than adding
the quality after development.
 You cannot test quality into software
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Examples Of Continuous Process Improvement
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Defect Elimination Process
Steps performed
1. Remove defect
2. Remove root cause of defect
3. Eliminate process escape deficiency
4. Search/analyze product for other, similar escapes
Process
Element
A
Process
Element
B
Process
Element
C
Process
Element
D
Product
Original Defect
Similar Additional
Undetected Defects
1
4
Root Cause2 Defect Escaped
Detection?
3
Defect
Introduced
Process Improvement Continuously Achieved
By Performing Feedback Steps 2 and 3
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Space Shuttle Flight Software 
Period Themes
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Years Theme Events
1978-1982 Initial System Development Supports Incrementally / STS-1 to STS-5  
Many Major Capabilities
1983-1985 Pre-Challenger Operations Incremental Development / Reductions in Staff during 
1985
1986-1988 Post-Challenger, Return to Flight Challenger Accident / PASS FSW Revalidation / 
Return to Flight
1989-1993 Process Optimization and Stability CMM Level 5 / GPC Memory/Speed Upgrade /
Skilled, Stable Workforce
1994-1997 Transition To Loral / Lockheed 
Martin 
Workforce Instability / OI-25 PTI DR Escapes / GPS 
Upgrade
1998-2002 Transition to United Space Alliance Restore Workforce Stability / Influx Of New Personnel
2003-2005 Post-Columbia / Return-To-Flight Cockpit Avionics Upgrade / Columbia Accident / 
Return to Flight
2006-2008 Shuttle Ending, OI Development OI-32, OI-33, OI-34 / Display Upgrades evolved From 
CAU /  CMMI Level 5 November 2006
2009-2011 Shuttle Ending, Skills Maintenance Skills Maintenance / Reductions-In-Workforce /
CMMI Level 5 in September 2009
Space Shuttle Flight Software Period Themes
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PASS FSW Development History
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Space Shuttle Flight Software 
Accomplishments
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Initial Development (1978 – 1982)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of 
Development
 Transition from ALT work to OFT development
 Expansion of orbit FSW capability post STS-1
 First Flight Capabilities
 Schedule driven, heavy change request traffic
 Early Systems Management / Payload Management 
Software
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Pre-Challenger Accident (1983 – 1985)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of 
Development
 Rendezvous
 Full Redesigned SM/PL Capabilities
 RMS Deploy and Retrieval
 Centaur Development
 Spacelab
 Main Engine Control redesign
 Payload manifesting flexibility
 Crew enhancements
 Enhanced ground checkout
 Western Test Range (Vandenberg)
 Reconfiguration tool planning / development
 Tools and procedures planning / development for DOD 
flights
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Post Challenger Accident (1986 – 1988)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of 
Development
 Post-51L Safety Changes
 Bailout Capability
 Abort Enhancements
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CMM Lvl 5 Process Under IBM (1989 to 1993)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of 
Development
 GPC Upgrade
 Extended Landing Site Table
 OPS 3 (TAL Code) in upper memory
 Redesigned Abort sequencer
 2 Engine Out Auto Contingency Aborts
 OV-105 Hardware changes
 On-Orbit Changes
 MIR Docking
 On-Orbit DAP Changes
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Loral / Lockheed Martin (1994 to 1997)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of 
Development
 Mir Docking Adapter
 On-Orbit DAP Changes
 3 Engine Out Auto Contingency Aborts
 Ascent Performance Enhancements
 Single-String GPS
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United Space Alliance (1998 to 2002)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of 
Development
 3-String GPS
 East Coast Abort Landing (ECAL) Automation
 Automatic Reboost
 GPC Payload Command Filter (GPCF)
 Increased data to MEDS
 Start of Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU) builds
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Post-Columbia, Return To Flight (2003 to 2005)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of 
Development
 Last of CAU builds
 Enhanced ADI / HSI capability
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OI Development Continuing (2006 – 2008)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of 
Development
 Lambert Guidance Improvements
 6x Traj display redesign
 Entry and Ascent Bearing Display additions
 RTLS ET Sep improvements
 Entry Remote Controlled Orbiter (RCO) Capability
 Elimination of old user notes and DRs
 Reduction in Horizontal Sit display code size
 Year End Roll Over (YERO)
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Look At Improvement 
Through Latent Product DRs
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Number Of Latent Unknown Product DRs Flown
Product DRs that existed on a flown system, but were unknown at the 
time of the flight .  Discovered up to 25 years later.
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Years New 
Product 
DRs 
Introduced 
In Period
Latent, 
Unknown 
Product 
DRs At End 
of Period
Flight Days 
Over 
Period
DRs 
Occurring 
In Flight
Latent, 
Unknown 
Severity 1 
DRs
1978-1982 523 424 29 3 4
1983-1985 109 322 147 8 6
1986-1988 16 240 None No Flights No Flights
1989-1993 22 140 291 1 0
1994-1997 12 100 365 4 0
1998-2002 8 39 675 2 0
2003-2005 0 20 None No Flights No Flights
2006-2008 1 2 162 1 0
2009-2011 0 N/A 114 0 0
Summary Of Product DR By Period
 Supporting information available in more detail backup presentation.
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Take Away From History Of Latent Product DRs
 Initial System Development period for future systems likely to be similar to 
that for the Space Shuttle
 Likely first flight will have a large number of unknown software 
discrepancies some of which may be Severity 1
 Transition to Operations period likely to produce the maximum number of 
in-flight software discrepancies
 Significant software maintenance activity as latent Product DRs are 
discovered, analyzed, and fixed as appropriate
 Concurrently, program push to add capabilities which could not be 
implemented during the development period
 Staffing reduction occurring from development period level to steady 
state operations level
 Planned automation likely slightly behind staffing reductions based on 
the original automation schedule
 Quality improvements made in 1986 to 1988 for PASS were critical to the 
success in later years
 It takes a long time for unknown latent software defects to be identified
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Space Shuttle Flight Software 
Quality Measurements
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Years Product Error 
Rate
DRs / KSLOC
Pre-Build Error 
Detection 
Effectiveness
Verification 
Effectiveness 
(Percent Found 
By SRR)
Notes
1978-1982 0.8 (STS-1) to 1.1 Information Not 
Available
77 % to 91 % (STS-1)
1983-1985 2.8 (OI-1) to 1.1 40 % to 65 % 70 % to 80 % Very Short Cycle -
Release Every 4 Mo.
1986-1988 0.7 to 0.2 (OI-8C) Near 80 % 60 % to 70 % Return-to-flight 
Critical Changes
1989-1993 0.1 to 0.2 80 % to 90 % 80% to 90 %
1994-1997 0.1 to 0.2         
except 0.8 for OI-25
75 % to 85 % 85 % to 100 %         
except 60 % for OI-25
Isolated Process 
Escape on OI-25
1998-2002 0.1 to 0.2 85 % to 90 % 85 % to 95 %
2003-2005 CAU Canceled CAU Canceled CAU Canceled Work on CAU   
required changes, 
Later   CAU  
Canceled
2006-2008 0.0 to 0.1 80 % to 100% 95 % to 100 %
2009-2011 No OI Development No OI Development No Development Reduced Flight 
System Changes 
Only, No OI Dev.
Summary Of Quality Metrics By Period
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Take Away From History Of Quality Metrics
 STS-1 quality was extremely high
 0.80 Product DRs / KSLOC 
 91 % of DRs detected by flight
 Transition to operations in parallel with shortened development  
schedules (CI every 4 months) resulted in a sharp increase in Product 
Error Rate
 OI-1, Product Error Rate 2.8 Product DRs per KSLOC
 By OI-8C (1988) Product Error Rate down to 0.2 Product DRs per 
KSLOC
 Range of 0 to 0.2 Product DRs per KSLOC has been sustained 
since then with the exception of one capability on OI-25
 Significant effort expended on PASS changes required for Cockpit 
Avionics Upgrade (CAU).  PASS changes not used following 
cancellation of CAU.
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Space Shuttle Flight Software 
Reliability
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Years Calendar Days 
Between Any 
Product DR
Flight Days 
Between In-Flight 
DRs
Risk To Shuttle Due To 
Severity 1 FSW DR
1978-1982 6 (STS-1), 7 (STS-5) 7 (STS-1), 9 (STS-5) 1 in 327 (STS-1) to 1 in 409 (STS-5)
1983-1985 10 to 19 12 to 24 1 in 552    to    1 in 1072
1986-1988 29 at STS-26 90 at STS-26 1 in 1599    at        STS-26
1989-1993 29 to 42 90 to 131 1 in 1599    to    1 in 2335
1994-1997 42 to 54 131 to 120 1 in 2335    to    1 in 3161
1998-2002 54 to 61 120 to 140 1 in 3161    to    1 in 3491
2003-2005 75 at STS-114 235 at STS-114 1 in 4212    at      STS-114
2006-2008 75 to 88 235 to 276 1 in 4212    to   1 in 4930
2009-2011 88 to 94 276 to 294 1 in 4930    to   1 in 6260
Summary Of Modeled Reliability By Period
 Risk level of approximately 1 in 1000 at January 2006 established during 
reliability research in the late 1980’s as a Return-To-Flight action.  Variation over 
time based on MTBF as calendar days between any Product DR’s.
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Take Away From Reliability Information
 Early failure rates (calendar days between Product DRs) were on the order 
of 10 days.
 Almost identical in-flight failure rate (flight days between in-flight DRs)
 Trend of risk of Severity 1 DR (loss of crew or vehicle)
 Early flights on the order of 1 in 400
 STS-26 on the order of 1 in 1600
 Current flights on the order of 1 in 6000
 Severity 1 DR small sample size insufficient to accurately assess 
probabilities
 Estimates are believed to be conservative (actual risk is lower)
 Extraordinary improvement in-flight failure rate from STS-51L (Challenger 
Accident) to STS-26 (Return-to-Flight)
 From 24 flight days between in-flight DRs to 90 days (factor of 3 
increase)
 Major contributors
 “Revalidation” Return-to-flight audits and actions
 Full implementation of automatic flight reconfiguration
 Factor of 3 increase in Software Production Facilities testing 
capacity driven by AP-101B/AP-101S concurrent production
Page 32
8/12/2010
Space Shuttle Flight Software 
Lessons Learned
 This section provides summaries of key items for lessons learned 
from in-flight DRs and released Severity 1 DRs.
 Data from across all periods was developed separately.  Then, lessons 
learned were consolidated.
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Lessons Learned Over the Years
 Scenarios
 All possible scenarios must be identified, addressed in 
requirements, accommodated via design/code, and tested.
 Insure that proper initialization will occur under all scenarios 
supported by the software.
 Requirements must address what is to be done for failed 
hardware under all scenarios supported by the software.
 Scenario analysis must identify the maximum ranges for 
parameters under all scenarios.  Variable precision must 
correctly support the maximum ranges.
 Many scenarios-related problems have extremely small timing 
windows.  Very unlikely to detect during testing only.  May 
require “Multi-Pass” analysis methods to insure identification.  
 Implement robust scenario testing.  Adequate test facility 
resources required including resources for off-nominal testing.
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Lessons Learned Over the Years
 Interface Testing
 Software Interface Control Document requirements must be 
explicitly verified in an end-to-end manner.
 Two in-flight DRs due to failure to verify PASS SM to Spacelab 
ICD.  
 Both required in-flight patches due to mission objective 
impacts for specific payloads.
 Analyze Error Logs
 Anomalies occurring which resulted in signatures being written to 
software error logs may go undetected unless the software error 
logs are analyzed after the run.
 Procedures are documented to always require analysis of 
software error logs after completion of the test.
 Test may be designed to automatically stop if a certain types of 
error conditions occur such as GPC errors.
 Allows for capturing full software memory at the time of the 
error condition.
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Lessons Learned Over the Years
 Simulation Models
 Collect appropriate data during simulated hardware tests so that 
any anomaly occurring is identified.
 Models in the software test environment must provide valid outputs
 Timing related software problems will be impossible to detect in 
simulation unless the hardware models provide random 
variation similar to actual hardware characteristics.
 Using checkpoints and restart capabilities may additionally 
limit the number of opportunities to observe timing related 
software problems even if the simulation supports random 
hardware timing variation.
 Use of checkpoints and restart capabilities is highly 
desirable.  These capabilities allow for efficient use of test 
facility resources.  These capabilities also greatly enhance 
the ability to duplicate problems by providing a duplicate 
software/environment state just prior to the event being 
duplicated.
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Lessons Learned Over the Years
 Hardware / Software Integration Testing
 Using checkpoints and restart capabilities may limit the number of 
opportunities to observe timing related software problems.
 Multiple tests from the same source checkpoint will have one 
fixed set of software internal timing relationships.
 Collect appropriate data during hardware tests so that any anomaly 
occurring is identified.
 Latent defects can remain in the FSW multiple years until scenario 
and hardware re-action timing align .
 Manual processes
 Many process such as late updates to flight reconfiguration are 
initially done manually.  Three in-flight DRs in the 1983 -1985 period 
introduced this way.  Manual processes require continuous 
management oversight to insure rigorous and correct execution.
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Lessons Learned Over the Years
 “Apparently Unrelated” Changes
 Multiple “apparently unrelated” changes can collectively produce 
unexpected erroneous consequences.
 Regression testing required to insure software functions 
continue to work correctly. 
 Ever present risk to “stumble” into maintenance traps once the 
maintenance trap is introduced into the software.
 Maintenance trap is typically the result of waiving programming 
standards for some small short term savings in implementation 
time, code space, or computer performance.
 These short term savings are insignificant compared to the 
long term project cost incurred during maintenance phase.
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Lessons Learned Over the Years
 Essential to formalize management and lead analysts responsibility for 
assessing skills proficiency and work performance history for every 
individual on every team and evaluate risk based on skills mix with 
closed loop responsibility to program manager.
 Every change to human rated flight software must be implemented 
with the same professional attention to detail by knowledgeable 
and motivated personnel.
 Essential to collect measurements data and proactively analyze data to 
search for “in process” symptoms such as Pre-Build Errors found in 
inspections by only one inspector.
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Lessons Learned Over the Years
 Specific Examples 
 Verification analyst participation in the pre-build inspection 
process significantly adds quality
 Prior to mid part of Release 19 (STS-5), the Verification analysts 
did not participate in pre-build design/code inspections.  
However, they did participate in inspections of patches 
implemented on STS-1 due to the perceived increased risk of 
patch implementation over source changes.
 Assessment of the quality of the STS-1 patches versus the STS-
2 source changes for the same DR and CR implementation 
resulted in the observation that the STS-1 patches were of 
higher quality.
 Following this conclusion, the pre-build design/code inspection 
process was modified to require participation of the Verification 
analyst.
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Lessons Learned Over the Years
 Specific Examples 
 Sequential inspections (e.g., development only peer review 
followed by pre-build inspection) are equally effective in removing 
the same % of errors that exist at the start of the inspection.
 A single inspection removes about 55 % of errors
 Two sequential inspection each remove about 55 % of errors 
remaining at the start of each inspection.
 Collectively, they remove 80 % of the errors present at the first 
inspection.
 Similar results are obtained when the criteria for having a re-
inspection generally results in re-inspections when undetected 
errors remain after an initial inspection
 With appropriate re-inspection criteria, it is possible to remove 
80 % of the errors present at the first inspection.
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Summary
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Contributors To PASS FSW High Quality
Contributor To PASS FSW High Quality Context
Multiple releases and multiple iterations of 
testing prior to STS-1.
Delays in launch date due to TPS and SSME issues 
provided more testing time and more opportunities to fix 
identified problems.
Fully automated Flight-to-Flight 
Reconfiguration Process and Tools
Early flights had a number of System Management in-
flight failures due to late manual updates.
Structured “PASS Revalidation” activities 
between Challenger accident and STS-26
Direct contributor to eliminating Severity 1 (Loss of 
crew/vehicle) DRs from PASS
Continual enhancements of the 
Requirements/Design/Code/Test Inspection 
Processes
 Have appropriate participation in each type of 
inspection including external community participation
 Having appropriate re-inspection criteria
Adequate test facility functionality and capacity 
(equipment to execute cases on flight 
equivalent hardware)
Significant improvement in in-flight reliability between 
STS-51L and STS-26 during a period when test facility 
capacity increased by a factor of 3.
Defined criteria for selection of personnel for 
teams; define how to resist over commitment 
of critical skills.
Critical skills management has always been a priority. 
Re-enforced by action From OI-25 PTI DRs where team 
skill and over commitment were contributing factors.
Rigorous configuration management of all 
products including requirements, design, code, 
and tests.
Basic necessary condition
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Wrap-up
 This presentation has shown the accomplishments of the PASS project 
over three decades and highlighted the lessons learned.
 Over the entire time, our goal has been to 
 Continuously improve our process
 Implement automation for both quality and increased productivity
 Identify and remove all defects due to prior execution of a flawed 
process in addition to improving our processes following 
identification of significant process escapes
 Morale and workforce instability have been issues, most significantly 
during 1993 to 1998 (period of consolidation in aerospace industry).
 The PASS project has also consulted with others, including the 
Software Engineering Institute, so as to be an early evaluator, adopter, 
and adapter of state-of-the-art software engineering innovations.
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Acronyms
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Acronyms
Acronym
ADI Attitude Direction Indicator
ALT Approach and Landing Test
AP-101B Initial flight computer for Space Shuttle; 104 K 32-bit full works of 
Memory
AP-101S Upgrade flight computer for Space Shuttle; 256 K 32-bit full words
of Memory (256K 32-bit FWs = 1MB 8-bit bytes).
ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle
CAIL CEV Avionics Integration Lab
CAU Cockpit Avionics Upgrade
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle
CI Configuration Inspection
CM Configuration Management
CMM Capability Maturity Model
CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integrated
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Acronyms
Acronym
CPU Central Processing Unit
DAP Digital Auto Pilot
DOD Department of Defense
DR, DRs Discrepancy Report(s)
ECAL East Coast Abort Landing
ET External Tank
FSW Flight Software
GPC General Purpose Computer
GPCF GPC Payload Command Filter 
GPS Global Positioning System
HIS Horizontal Situation Indicator
HTV H-II Transfer Vehicle
ICD Interface Control Document
KSC Kennedy Space Center
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Acronyms
Acronym
KLSOC 1000 Non-Comment Source Lines of Code (new, changed, and 
deleted)
MEDS Multifunction Electronic Display System
MIR Name of the Russian Space Station
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OFT Orbital Flight Test
OI Operational Increment
OPS Operational Sequences
OV Orbiter Vehicle
PTI Program Test Input
RCO Remotely Controlled Orbiter
RMS Remote Manipulator System
RTLS Return-To-Launch-Site
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Acronyms
Acronym
RTLS Return-To-Launch-Site
SAIL Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
SASCB Shuttle Avionics Software Control Board
SEI Software Engineering Institute
SM Systems Management
SM/PL Systems Management/Payload
SMS Shuttle Mission Simulator
SRR Software Readiness Review, typically 4 weeks prior to flight
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
STS Space Transportation System
TAL Transoceanic Abort Landing
TPS Thermal Protection System
Traj Trajectory
YERO Year End Roll Over
